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HICKORY DICKORY DOCK, THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
STOPS THE CLOCK: LEGISLATURE MUST REFORM THE
SPILL ACT FOLLOWING MORRISTOWN
ASSOCIATES v. GRANT OIL
MARIA SALVEMINI*
“Account must also be taken of the pollution produced by residue, in-
cluding dangerous waste present in different areas. . . .  The earth, our
home, is beginning to look more and more
like an immense pile of filth.”1
I. ONCE UPON A TIME: A LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NEW JERSEY SPILL ACT
In 2010, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) identi-
fied over 20,000 sites in New Jersey that require remediation due to con-
tamination.2  Estimates suggest over 53,000 sites have been remediated
from 1979 to 2010 in New Jersey.3  Despite remediation efforts, the num-
ber of contaminated sites increased.4  The DEP attributed the rise to fac-
tors including “increasing population, a growing industrial base that relies
on the use of hazardous materials, as well as increased awareness of the
risk posed by certain chemicals, and new technologies that are able to de-
tect these chemicals.”5
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2014, Villanova University.  I would like to thank my family, especially my
parents, Pasquale and Martha Salvemini, and brother, Corrado Salvemini, for their
love and encouragement throughout my academic career, and Joseph Schiazza for
his constant support.  The inspiration for the title comes from the nursery rhyme
“Hickory Dickory Dock” and David Edelstein and Craig Huber’s article, Tick, Tock:
Appellate Court Starts the Clock on Spill Act Contribution Claims, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 2013,
available at http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202629127153/Tick-Tock-Appel
late-Court-Starts-the-Clock-on-Spill-Act-Contribution-Claims?slreturn=20160230000
732 [http://perma.cc/27JY-ZQCH].
1. Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si of the Holy Father Francis on
Care for Our Common Home 1, 17 (2015), available at http://w2.vatican.va/con
tent/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enci
clica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LKK-N7KQ] (quoting thoughts on pol-
lution and climate change).
2. See Site Remediation, N.J. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT. 1, 1 (2014), available at http://
www.nj.gov/dep/dsr/trends/pdfs/site.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA9W-MXTP] (dis-
cussing potential site contamination in New Jersey).
3. See id. at 2 (estimating number of remediated sites from 1970 to 2010).
4. See id. at 1–2 (explaining increase in contaminated sites in New Jersey).
5. See id. at 2 (explaining possible factors causing increase in number of con-
taminated sites).
(351)
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The New Jersey legislature passed the New Jersey Spill Compensation
and Control Act (Spill Act) in 1976.6  The Spill Act allows parties who
engage in remediation of contaminated property to collect from responsi-
ble parties via contribution claims.7  The legislature originally passed the
Spill Act due to concerns over offshore oil spills, but later amended the
law to extend to land contamination.8  Under the Spill Act, the available
defenses were amended to include only those due to “war, sabotage, or
God.”9  The Spill Act also added a private right of contribution, so parties
paying for the remediation can recover from other responsible parties.10
Despite previous amendments to refine and clarify the Spill Act, the legis-
lature never explicitly added a statute of limitations for contribution
claims.11  The Spill Act’s perceived silence as to whether a statute of limita-
tions applies to contribution claims caused disagreement among the New
Jersey state and district courts.12  Specifically, the New Jersey courts dis-
agreed about whether a six-year statute of limitations applied to contribu-
tion claims.13
In the highly anticipated Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co.14 deci-
sion, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a statute of limita-
6. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (West 2015).  The Spill Act was the “first
program in the [United States] to cleanup, or remediate, contaminated sites that
posed a danger to human health and the environment.” See Site Remediation, supra
note 2, at 1 (discussing history of Spill Act).
7. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (“In resolving contribution
claims, a court may allocate the costs of cleanup and removal among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”); see also
1991 N.J. Laws 316–17 (amending Spill Act to include contribution provision).
8. See, e.g., Buonviaggio v. Hillsborough Twp. Comm., 583 A.2d 739, 739–40
(N.J. 1991) (discussing fear about contamination caused by offshore spills).  The
Spill Act went through two notable amendments, the first in 1979 and the second
in 1991. See 1991 N.J. Laws 307 (amending Spill Act); 1979 N.J. Laws 1412 (same).
9. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(d)(1) (stating defenses available under
contribution claims).
10. See id. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (“In an action for contribution, the contri-
bution plaintiffs need prove only that a discharge occurred for which the contribu-
tion defendant or defendants are liable pursuant to [other provisions].”); see also
1991 N.J. Laws 307 (adding right of contribution under Spill Act).
11. See, e.g., Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 446
(D.N.J. 2009) (“The Spill Act does not contain a statute of limitations for private
contribution actions.”). See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (remaining si-
lent on statute of limitations for contribution claims).
12. See infra note 13.
13. See, e.g., Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (holding six-year statute of limi-
tations applies to contribution claims under Spill Act); Champion Labs., Inc. v.
Metex Corp., No. 02-5284 (WHW), 2005 WL 1606921, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2005)
(holding six-year statute of limitations applies to contribution claims under Spill
Act); Mason v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. A-885-98T1, 1999 WL 33605936, at *4 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 8, 1999) (per curiam) (holding six-year statute of limita-
tions does not bar contribution action under Spill Act); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker
Indus., Inc., 649 A.2d 1325, 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding statute
of repose does not bar contribution action under Spill Act).
14. (Morristown Assocs. II), 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015).
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tions applies to contribution claims under the Spill Act.15  The New Jersey
Supreme Court overruled two lower courts and held no statute of limita-
tions applies to contribution claims under the Spill Act.16  Focusing on the
legislative intent and the plain text of the statute, the court invited the
legislature to take action if it disagreed with its ruling, indicating the
court’s ruling may not be the final word on the matter.17
This Note agrees that the Morristown Associates ruling was correct, but
argues the legislature should add a statute of limitations to the Spill Act.18
A statute of limitations would be beneficial to prevent the Spill Act from
unfairly favoring plaintiffs while making it more difficult for defendants to
dismiss contribution claims.19  Part II of this Note provides an overview of
the Spill Act and its amendments and describes the state and federal case
law that preceded Morristown Associates.20  Part III sets out the facts, hold-
ing, and analysis of the Morristown Associates decision.21  Part IV contends
15. See Lawrence E. Bradford, Environmental News Flash: New Jersey Supreme
Court Rules That Six-Year Statute of Limitations Does Not Apply to Spill Act Claims, COLE
SCHOTZ P.C. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. MONITOR (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.environ-
mentalandenergylawmonitor.com/2015/01/articles/environmental-litigation/
new-jersey-supreme-court-rules-that-six-year-statute-of-limitations-does-not-apply-to-
spill-act-claims/ [https://perma.cc/69K3-NWTV] (emphasizing anticipation over
supreme court decision).  Environmental attorneys considered the court’s decision
in Morristown Associates critical to plaintiffs’ ability to bring contribution claims and
defendants’ means to defeat them. See, e.g., Bruce Katcher, Nicole Moshang &
Diana Silva, The New Jersey Supreme Court Holds Spill Act Contribution Claims Are Not
Subject to a Statute of Limitations Defense, SPECIAL ALERT (Manko, Gold, Katcher &
Fox, Phila., Pa.), Feb. 3, 2015, available at http://www.mankogold.com/pp/alert-
504.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KM8-9E7R] (calling Morristown v. Associates “land-
mark decision”).  Attorneys were also concerned that a ruling imposing a statute of
limitations could result in numerous malpractice lawsuits. See Martin Bricketto, NJ
High Court Mulls Time Limit in Spill Act Suits, LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www
.law360.com/articles/584459/nj-high-court-mulls-time-limit-in-spill-act-suits
[https://perma.cc/BSM9-55M6] (discussing tension concerning threat of mal-
practice litigation following ruling that imposed statute of limitations).  “Defend-
ants hoping the New Jersey Supreme Court will bless a six-year window for private
contribution actions under the state’s Spill Compensation and Control Act fought
back Monday against arguments that such a ruling would represent a sea change
and unfairly expose attorneys to malpractice claims.” Id.
16. See generally Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1189 (“In sum, the plain text
supports that the Legislature intended to include no statute of limitations defense
for contribution defendants.”).
17. See id.  at 1190 (indicating legislature can “fix any interpretive misunder-
standing” by court); see also infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (emphasiz-
ing impact of Morristown Associates decision).  The New Jersey Supreme Court
actually invited the legislature to take action to amend the Spill Act if it disagrees
with its interpretation of the Act. See id.
18. For a further discussion of the need to reform the Spill Act, see infra notes
125–56 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the need for a legislative amendment of the
Spill Act, see id.
20. For a further discussion of the Spill Act and relevant case law, see infra
notes  25–76 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holding in
Morristown Associates, see infra notes 77–123 and accompanying text.
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that the legislature should amend the Spill Act to include a statute of limi-
tations.22  Part V provides advice for practitioners, focusing on how attor-
neys should advise their clients in light of Morristown Associates.23  Part VI
explores the impact of the decision.24
II. WINDING BACK THE CLOCK: THE LAWS LEADING UP
TO MORRISTOWN ASSOCIATES
The New Jersey legislature enacted the Spill Act in 1976 to ensure the
safe handling of hazardous substances and establish liability in the event
such substances are discharged and cause damage.25  Over the next few
decades, the legislature amended the Spill Act to expand liability and limit
available defenses, allow for contribution claims, and extend liability over
owners of real property for discharge on their lands.26  Despite these
amendments, confusion over whether the Spill Act is silent as to a statute
of limitations led state and federal courts to reach contradictory
holdings.27
22. For a further discussion of the need for legislative reform, see infra notes
124–56 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of advice for attorneys following the Morristown
Associates decision, see infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of the impact of Morristown Associates, see infra
notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
25. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a (West 2015) (stating legislative intent
behind Spill Act).
The Legislature intends by the passage of this act to exercise the powers
of this State to control the transfer and storage of hazardous substances
and to provide liability for damage sustained within this State as a result
of any discharge of said substances, by requiring the prompt containment
and removal of such pollution and substances, and to provide a fund for
swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses and other persons
damaged by such discharges, and to provide for the defense and indem-
nification of certain persons under contract with the State for claims or
actions resulting from the provision of services or work to mitigate or
clean up a release or discharge of hazardous substances.
Id.
26. See 1993 N.J. Laws 567 (amending Spill Act to extend liability); 1991 N.J.
Laws 307 (amending Spill Act); 1979 N.J. Laws 1412 (same); see also Michael D.
Sirota, Michael S. Meisel & Gerard M. Giordano, New Jersey Spill Compensation and
Control Act (“Spill Act”), 44 N.J. PRAC., DEBTOR–CREDITOR L. & PRAC. § 9.13 (discuss-
ing 1993 amendment to Spill Act making “any person who owns real property that
was acquired after September 14, 1993 at which there has been a discharge, a
person responsible for that discharge”).
27. For a further discussion of the division between New Jersey state and fed-
eral court, see infra notes 42–76 and accompanying text.
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A. New Jersey Spill Act Provides Around-the-Clock Protection
for the State’s Most Valuable Resources
The Spill Act was born out of fear that offshore drilling would harm
New Jersey’s environment and tourist industry.28  The state legislature cre-
ated the Spill Act to protect and preserve land and water resources and to
promote the “health, safety and welfare” of New Jersey’s residents.29  The
Spill Act was the first program in the country to clean up contaminated
28. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a (“[H]azardous substances . . . whether
onshore or offshore[ ] [are] a hazardous undertaking and impose[ ] [a] risk of
damage to persons and property . . . . ”); Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 703
A.2d 927, 930 (N.J. 1997) (illustrating inspiration behind creation of Spill Act and
explaining “The Spill Act was adopted in 1975 to deal with potential contamina-
tion from off-shore oil shore oil spills . . . .”); Francis E.P. McCarter, New Jersey Clean
up Your “Act”: Some Reflections on the Spill Compensation and Control Act, 38 RUTGERS L.
REV. 637, 643 (1986) (explaining events leading up to and influencing creation of
Spill Act).  In 1967, the Torrey Canyon oil spill seeped 100,000 tons of crude oil off
the coast of Cornwall in British waters, severely damaging beaches and harming
wildlife. See id. at 642 (noting important supertanker accidents prior to com-
mencement of New Jersey oil drilling); Patrick Barkham, Oil Spills: Legacy of the
Torrey Canyon, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2010/jun/24/torrey-canyon-oil-spill-deepwater-bp [https://perma.cc/
9RGQ-CHPN] (discussing impact of Torrey Canyon oil spill and damage caused to
beaches and reporting “[a]n estimated 15,000 birds were killed [and] [s]eal and
other marine life also perished”); Reuters, Britain Faulted on Oil-Spill Damage Esti-
mates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/27/world/
britain-faulted-on-oil-spill-damage-estimates.html [https://perma.cc/N7QU-
8RPN] (discussing extent of damage caused by Torrey Canyon oil spill and
reporting).
29. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a (noting purpose of Spill Act).  The legis-
lature emphasized the state’s land and water resources are very important. See id.
(“The Legislature finds and declares: that New Jersey’s lands and waters constitute
a unique and delicately balanced resource . . . .”).  In particular the legislature
stressed, “that the tourist and recreation industry dependent on clean waters and
beaches is vital to the economy of [New Jersey] . . . .” See id.; see also Buonviaggio v.
Hillsborough Twp. Comm., 583 A.2d 739, 740 (N.J. 1991) (“The New Jersey tourist
industry dreaded a massive oil spill that could seriously damage the beaches and
waterways of the state.”).  The Act was originally adopted because of concerns sur-
rounding expected development of gas and oil reserves off New Jersey’s coast. See
Elga A. Goodman, Kristina K. Pappa, Brent A. Olson, Susanne Peticolas & Paul M.
Hauge, Hazardous Discharge Prevention and Liability—The Spill Compensation and Con-
trol Act, 50A N.J. PRAC., BUS. L. DESKBOOK § 27:12 (“Originally adopted in 1976 to
address concerns about the anticipated development of oil and gas reserves off the
New Jersey coast, the Spill Act was later amended to address other hazardous sub-
stance issues.” (footnote omitted)).  The legislature articulated its concern for the
negative impact petroleum products could have on New Jersey, and emphasized
how the Spill Act was supposed to alleviate such concerns. See 1976 N.J. Laws 622
(emphasizing intent behind Spill Act).
The Legislature finds and declares the discharge of petroleum prod-
ucts and other hazardous substances within or outside the jurisdiction of
this State constitutes a threat to the economy and environment of this
State.  The Legislature intends by the passage of this act to exercise the
powers of this State to control the transfer and storage of hazardous sub-
stances and to provide liability for damage sustained within this State as a
result of any discharge of said substances, by requiring the prompt con-
tainment and removal of such pollution and substances, and to provide a
5
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sites.30  The New Jersey legislature articulated the importance of remediat-
ing contaminated lands, which often go unused or underutilized and be-
come an “economic drain” on the state and local government.31
Remediation restores the utility of contaminated sites.32  The Spill Act also
created a Spill Fund to pay for costs associated with prevention and
remediation, which was an important component of the law.33
1. 1979 Revision
Following the tragedy at Love Canal, the New Jersey legislature made
substantial changes to broaden the scope of the Spill Act.34  The Spill
Act’s liability section was amended to hold an owner or operator “jointly
fund for swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses and other
persons damaged by such discharge.
Id.
30. See Site Remediation, supra note 2 (discussing history and progressiveness of
Spill Act).
The federal government passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980. See generally 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9628 (2012).  Comparisons have been made between the Spill Act and
CERCLA, but there are important differences. See, e.g., New Jersey Has No Time Limit
on Cleanup-Contribution Actions, State High Court Rules: Morristown Assocs. v. Grant
Oil Co., WESTLAW J. ENVTL., Feb. 18, 2015, at 2, *1 (“The Spill Act is New Jersey’s
equivalent to the federal Superfund law—the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601—which has similar con-
tribution provisions to enable polluters that voluntarily clean up spills to recoup
costs from other responsible parties.”).  The most significant difference between
the two pieces of legislation, for the purposes of this Note, is that CERCLA has an
explicit statute of limitations for contribution claims and the Spill Act does not. See
Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176, 1188 n.7 (N.J. 2015) (noting important distinc-
tion between CERCLA and Spill Act); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d
816, 831–33 (N.J. 2012) (distinguishing CERCLA from Spill Act).  Another impor-
tant difference between the Spill Act and CERCLA is that the former includes
petroleum in its definition of “hazardous substances,” whereas CERCLA does not.
See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and
Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 98 (1994) (discussing differences between CER-
CLA and Spill Act).
31. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a (explaining contaminated sites must be
cleaned up and “returned to productive use” to benefit public interest).
32. See id. (discussing importance of cleaning contaminated sites).
33. See id. § 58:10-23.11g; see also Buonviaggio, 583 A.2d at 740.  The court in
Buonviaggio explains “[t]he purpose of the Spill Fund is to finance the prevention
and cleanup of oil spills and hazardous-waste discharges and to compensate resort
businesses and other people damaged by such discharges.” See id.
34. See 1979 N.J. Laws 1412 (amending Spill Act); see also Marsh v. N.J. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 703 A.2d 927, 930 (N.J. 1997) (discussing inspiration for 1979 Spill
Act Revision).  Love Canal was an unfinished waterway in New York that had been
used as a chemical dumping site before it was covered with dirt and sold to the
local school district. See Andrew C. Revkin, Love Canal and Its Mixed Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/booming/love-canal-
and-its-mixed-legacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PFB7-C9TB].  Following Love
Canal, the severely contaminated land had a devastating impact on the health of
nearby residents and the environment. See id.
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and severally” liable if a discharge resulted from “gross negligence, willful
misconduct,” or “a gross or willful violation.”35  Most importantly, the de-
fenses available under the Spill Act were changed.36  Governmental negli-
gence or third-party defenses were removed from the Spill Act so that “an
act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a combination
thereof” were the only available defenses.37
35. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(b) (adding joint and several liability);
Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1185–86 (discussing amendment to subsection (b)
of Act’s liability section).
The original text of the statute capped recoverable damages against the owner
or operator of a major facility or vessel at a maximum of $50,000,000.00, unless the
discharge resulted from “(1) gross negligence or willful misconduct, within the
knowledge and privity of the owner, operator or person in charge, or (2) a gross or
willful violation of applicable safety, construction or operating standards or regula-
tions.” See id.; see also 1976 N.J. Laws 627.  The text of the Act previously stated that
“such maximum limitation shall not apply and the owner or operator shall be lia-
ble for the full amount of such damages.” See id.  However, the 1979 amendment
altered the provision such that the maximum limitation no longer applies and “the
owner or operator shall be liable, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such
damages.” See 1979 N.J. Laws 1419 (emphasis added).
When two or more parties are jointly and severally liable for a tortious
act, each party is independently liable for the full extent of the injuries
stemming from the tortious act.  Thus, if a plaintiff wins a money judg-
ment against the parties collectively, the plaintiff may collect the full
value of the judgment from any one of them.  That party may then seek
contribution from other wrong-doers. See Joint and Several Liability, COR-
NELL U. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www
.law.cornell.edu/wex/joint_and_several_liability [https://perma.cc/
ZW46-3H5W].
Further, the class of potentially liable people was expanded. See 1979 N.J.
Laws 1419 (expanding who can be held liable under Act).  The amended section
included the requirement of joint and several liability. See id. at 1419–20 (discuss-
ing amendment).  The amended section reads:
Any person who has discharged a hazardous substance or is any way re-
sponsible for any hazardous substance which the department has re-
moved or is removing pursuant to subsection b. of section 7 of this act
shall be strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all
cleanup and removal costs.
Id. at 1420.
36. See 1979 N.J. Laws 1419 (discussing change to available defenses under
Spill Act).
37. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(d)(1) (listing defenses available under
contribution claims); see also 1979 N.J. Laws 1419–20 (discussing change to availa-
ble defenses under Spill Act).  The Act as it was passed in 1976 originally read:
An act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, governmental negli-
gence, God, or a third party or a combination thereof shall be the only
defenses which may be raised by an owner or operator of a major facility
or vessel responsible for a discharge in any action arising under the provi-
sions of this act.  For the purposes of this act, no employee or agent of
such owner or operator shall be considered as a third party.  Any other
person shall have available to him any defense authorized by common or
statutory law.
1976 N.J. Laws 627.  Notably, the 1979 amendments also deleted the sentence in
the original text of Section (d) permitting common law and statutory defenses. See
1979 N.J. Laws 1419.  The amended Section (d) reads:
7
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2. 1991: Amendment and Inclusion of Contribution Provision
The Spill Act did not originally contain a contribution provision, but
popularity of private party remediation actions alerted the legislature to
this need.38  The development of joint and several strict liability under the
Spill Act holds parties liable for the entire cost of the cleanup, regardless
of the party’s level of responsibility.39  As a result, more remediation ac-
tions were brought by private parties, alerting the legislature to the prob-
lem that a right of contribution existed in tort law but not under the Spill
Act.40  In 1991, amendments to the Spill Act included a contribution pro-
vision allowing those who clean up contaminated sites to seek contribution
from liable parties.41
An act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or God, or a combina-
tion thereof, shall be the only defenses which may be raised by any owner
or operator of a major facility or vessel responsible for discharge in any
action arising under the provisions of this act.
1979 N.J. Laws 1420.
38. See infra notes 39–41 (discussing 1991 addition of contribution provision).
39. See Magic Petroleum Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 95 A.3d 175, 182 (N.J.
2014) (describing joint and several liability structure of Spill Act).
40. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176, 1187 (N.J. 2015) (discussing in-
crease in private party actions and legislature’s awareness of disparity); see also S.
2657 & Gen. Assemb. 3659, 204th Leg. (N.J. 1991) (Sponsor’s Statement) (recog-
nizing “[i]n the normal course of tort law, this person would have a right of contri-
bution, the right to collect money from others jointly responsible for the costs”
and Spill Act lacked this).  “The prevalence of private party actions by remediating
parties, which include demands for contribution by other responsible parties not
subject to an agreement with the DEP, revealed to policy makers an ambiguity in
the Spill Act.” Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1187.
41. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a) (listing provisions of Spill Act).
The Spill Act was amended to “allow [ ] those parties who enter into an agreement
with [DEP] to remove a hazardous discharge to seek contribution from those re-
sponsible parties who have not entered into such an agreement.” Morristown As-
socs. II, 106 A.3d at 1187 (alterations in original).  The contribution provision
reads:
Whenever one or more dischargers or persons cleans up and removes a
discharge of a hazardous substance, those dischargers and persons shall
have a right of contribution against all other dischargers and persons in
any way responsible for a discharged hazardous substance or other per-
sons who are liable for the cost of the cleanup and removal of that dis-
charge of a hazardous substance.  In an action for contribution, the
contribution plaintiffs need prove only that a discharge occurred for
which the contribution defendant or defendants are liable pursuant to
[N.J.S.A 58:10-23.11g(c)], and the contribution defendant shall have only
the defenses to liability available to parties pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 58:10-
23.11g(d)].  In resolving contribution claims, a court may allocate the
costs of cleanup and removal among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a); see also 1991 N.J. Laws 316–17 (amending
Spill Act to include contribution provision).
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C. Different Time Zones: State and Federal Court Divided
on Statute of Limitations Issue
The New Jersey state and federal court were divided on whether a
statute of limitations applied to contribution claims under the Spill Act.42
State courts, relying on precedent that dealt with the statute of limitations
question and legislative intent, concluded no statute of limitations ap-
plied.43  Conversely, the federal court relied on precedent that inter-
preted the statute’s silence differently and applied a standard six-year
statute of limitations.44
1. State Case Law
The New Jersey state court used a textual approach to conclude no
statute of limitations applied to contribution claims under the Spill Act.45
The court interpreted the Spill Act’s list of defenses as explicit and conclu-
sive; therefore, the court held the only available defenses were those listed
in the Spill Act.46  Based on this interpretation, the state court continu-
ously refused to dismiss a contribution claim based on a statute of repose
or statute of limitations defense.47
In Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc.,48 the New Jersey Superior
Court held a statute of repose could not be used to defeat a Spill Act
42. Compare Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., Inc., 649 A.2d 1325, 1328 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding no statute of limitations applies), with Reich-
hold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 447 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding
six-year statute of limitations applies to contribution claims under Spill Act).
43. See, e.g., Mason v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. A-885-98T1, 1999 WL 33605936, at
*4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 8, 1999) (per curiam) (holding statute of limita-
tions does not bar contribution action under Spill Act).
44. See Champion Labs., Inc. v. Metex Corp., No. 02-5284(WHW), 2005 WL
1606921, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2005) (applying six-year statute of limitations and
holding plaintiff’s contribution claim under Spill Act was time barred); Montells v.
Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 655 (N.J. 1993) (imposing statute of limitations on silent
statute); Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1328 (holding ten-year statute of repose did not
bar contribution action under Spill Act). See generally Montells, 627 A.2d at 655
(holding general statute of limitations applies to Law Against Discrimination
claims where it was silent on such limitation); Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 447
(holding six-year statute of limitations should apply to contribution claims under
Spill Act).
45. See Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1326 (considering text of Spill Act).
46. See Mason, 1999 WL 33605936, at *4 (holding statute of limitations does
not bar contribution action under Spill Act); Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1325 (hold-
ing statute of repose does not bar contribution action under Spill Act).
47. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1325 (deciding not to apply statute of
repose or statute of limitations).  One New Jersey practitioner claims the majority
of attorneys in the state did not believe there was a statute of limitations. See Brick-
etto, supra note 15 (“Before an appellate decision in the case last year, there was
almost no environmental practitioner in New Jersey who thought there was a stat-
ute of limitations for such actions . . . .”).
48. 649 A.2d 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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contribution claim.49  The court stressed that the legislature’s intent in
enacting the contribution provisions “was to encourage prompt and effec-
tive remediation by any responsible party who might otherwise be disin-
clined to do so because of the risk and burden of bearing the entire cost
despite the responsibility of others for the creation and continuation of
the problem.”50  The court determined that allowing the statute of repose
to permit individuals covered under the Spill Act to escape liability would
undermine legislative intent.51  The court made it clear there was not a
temporal defense available to defendants under the Spill Act.52
The New Jersey Superior Court directly addressed the statute of limi-
tations question in Mason v. Mobil Oil Corp.53  In Mason, the court held the
49. See id. at 1328 (holding statute of repose does not bar contribution action
under Spill Act).  A statute of repose is defined as “[a]ny law that bars claims after
some action by the defendant, even if the plaintiff has not yet been injured.” See
Statute of Repose, CORNELL U. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/statute_of_repose [https://perma.cc/FU9N-LMAE] (last visited Mar.
30, 2016) (defining statute of repose); see also Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co.
(Morristown Assocs. I), 74 A.3d 968, 974 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“A statute
of repose is strictly applied to bar a claim without any regard to when the claimant
discovered or could reasonably have discovered the harm.”), rev’d, 106 A.3d 1176
(N.J. 2015).
In Pitney Bowes, the plaintiff subleased land that it discovered was contami-
nated by seepage of heating oil from improperly installed underground tanks. See
Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1325–26.  The plaintiff paid to clean and remediate the
land and then sued for reimbursement in May 1991. See id. at 1326.  The plaintiff
amended its complaint, in 1992, after the legislature amended the Spill Act, “af-
fording to those who pay for the remediation of a discharge of hazardous sub-
stances a private right of contribution against those who are also responsible for
the discharge.” See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f (West 2015) (adding
right of contribution to Spill Act).
50. See Pitney Bowes, 649 A.2d at 1326 (discussing legislative intent in enacting
contribution provision of Spill Act).  The court remarked, “[i]t is therefore self-
evident that the statutory purpose and policy would be defeated by excluding from
contribution liability the primarily responsible party because of the general and
prior enacted statute of repose.” See id. at 1327 (discussing importance of holding
responsible parties accountable to preserve statutory intent).  The court goes on to
emphasize “the obviously overriding purpose of the Spill Act was to respond to the
grave public consequences of hazardous-substance discharges that threaten the
health and safety of everyone.” See id. at 1328.
51. See id. (explaining how imposing statute of repose to contribution claims
undermines legislative intent).
52. See id. at 1327 (indicating no time defense exists under Spill Act).  The
Pitney Bowes court is often cited for its stance that “[t]here is no provision of any
defense available either to a direct or a contribution defendant based on the pas-
sage of time.” See id.
53. See Mason v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. A-885-98T1, 1999 WL 33605936, at *4
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 8, 1999) (per curiam) (addressing statute of limita-
tions).  The plaintiffs purchased land on which there was once an abandoned gaso-
line station and claimed they were told the underground tank were removed. See
id. at *1 (explaining plaintiffs’ knowledge concerning underground tanks on prop-
erty).  When the plaintiffs tried to sell the property, the buyer hired an environ-
mental consultant to examine the property and significant gasoline contamination
was discovered. See id.  The plaintiffs wanted contribution for remediation costs.
See id. at *2.
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state’s general six-year statute of limitations for trespass or injury to prop-
erty did not apply to contribution claims under the Spill Act.54  The court
reasoned the only defenses available were those listed under the liability
section of the Spill Act.55  The court found the reasoning in Pitney Bowes
“applies in full force, if not a fortiori, to a statute of limitations.”56  How-
ever, because Mason was unpublished, the court’s opinion was not given
precedential weight by other courts ruling on the statute of limitation
issue.57
2. Federal Case Law
The New Jersey District Court equated the lack of a statute of limita-
tions provision in the Spill Act to silence.58  Turning to other state prece-
dent for guidance, the federal court decided the statute of limitations
applied to contribution claims.59
To determine if a statute of limitations could be applied, the federal
court looked to New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that applied a stat-
ute of limitations to a silent statute in Montells v. Haynes.60  Notably, the
Montells court applied the statute of limitations prospectively rather than
54. See id. at *4 (holding six-year statute of limitations does not apply to con-
tribution claims under Spill Act).
55. See id. (finding only defenses available are those explicitly afforded by
Spill Act); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(d)(1) (listing defenses available
under Spill Act).
56. See Mason, 1999 WL 33605936, at *4 (finding Pitney Bowes reasoning
applies).
57. See, e.g., Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d 968, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2013) (declining to follow unpublished opinion, which lacked precedential value),
rev’d, 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015).
58. See Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 446
(D.N.J. 2009) (applying six-year statute of limitations to contribution claims under
Spill Act); see also New W. Urban Renewal Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 909 F.
Supp. 219, 228 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing application of limitations period to ac-
tions seeking similar relief at common law).  In Reichhold, the plaintiff sought dam-
ages from the defendant, a metal refining company for past and future costs to
clean up the plaintiff’s land, which was contaminated by chlorinated volatile or-
ganic compounds (CVOCS). See Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 404.  The plaintiff
brought its claims under the federal CERCLA and Spill Act. See id.
59. See, e.g., Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. at 447 (holding six-year statute of limita-
tions applies to contribution claims under Spill Act); Champion Labs., Inc. v.
Metex Corp., No. 02-5284 (WHW), 2005 WL 1606921, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2005)
(holding six-year statute of limitations applies to contribution claims under Spill
Act). The decision to apply a statute of limitations to Spill Act claims is arguably
consistent with the federal CERCLA legislation, which imposes a statute of limita-
tions. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d at 974 (referring to CERCLA, court reasoned
“[a]pplying a statute of limitations to Spill Act claims for contribution is consistent
with comparable remedies under federal law,” because CERCLA contains six-year
and three-year limitations periods); cf. Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 662 (N.J.
1993) (holding general statute of limitations applies to Law Against Discrimination
claims where statute was silent on such limitation).
60. See Montells, 627 A.2d at 657–62 (providing guidance concerning silent
statutes).
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retroactively.61  In Montells, the court addressed a claim under the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), which did not have an explicit
statute of limitations.62  The court held that “[t]he state of the law on the
applicable statute of limitations under LAD was sufficiently murky,” so it
applied a statute of limitations prospectively.63  The federal court gave sig-
nificant weight to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning in Montells
when deciding to apply a six-year statute of limitations to Spill Act contri-
bution claims.64
State precedent concerning the New Jersey discovery rule provided
further insight for the federal court to decide when to start the statute of
limitations clock.65  The discovery rule established in Lopez v. Swyer,66
stated that the statute of limitations started “from the moment of the
wrong.”67  The court in Kemp Industries v. Safety Light Corp.68 held a six-year
statute of limitations applied and discussed New Jersey’s discovery rule as it
related to the limitations period.69  The court acknowledged the discovery
rule was often applied in environmental tort cases because of the difficulty
in discovering an injury and determining responsibility.70
The leading federal decision concerning the application of a statute
of limitations to contribution claims under the Spill Act is Reichhold, Inc., v.
U.S. Metals Refining Co.71  The court in Reichhold determined the Spill Act
“d[id] not contain a statute of limitations for private contribution ac-
tions.”72  Under the reasoning in New W. Urban Renewal Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,73 courts must choose a limitations period from actions re-
questing comparable relief at common law.74  The court applied the six-
61. See id. (providing court’s holding).
62. See id. at 655 (holding general statute of limitations applies to Law Against
Discrimination claims when statute was silent on such limitation).
63. See id. at 662 (providing court’s holding).
64. See, e.g., Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (applying six-year statute of limi-
tations to contribution claims under Spill Act); Champion Labs., Inc. v. Metex
Corp., No. 02-5284 (WHW), 2005 WL 1606921, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2005) (apply-
ing six-year statute of limitations and held plaintiff’s contribution claim under Spill
Act was time barred); Kemp Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., No. 92–95 (AJL), 1994
WL 532130, at *17 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1994) (applying six-year statute of limitations
from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 to contribution claims under Spill Act).
65. For a further discussion of the discovery rule, see infra notes 66–70 and
accompanying text.
66. 300 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1973).
67. See id. at 566 (explaining when statute of limitations begins).
68. No. 92–95 (AJL), 1994 WL 532130 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1994).
69. See Kemp Indus., 1994 WL 532130, at *33 (discussing holding).
70. See id. at *17–18 (discussing application of discovery rule in environmen-
tal tort cases).
71. 655 F. Supp. 2d 400, 447 (D.N.J. 2009) (discussing statute of limitations).
72. Id. at 446.
73. 909 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1995).
74. See Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (holding six-year statute of limitations
should apply to contribution claim under Spill Act); see also New W. Urban Re-
newal Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 219, 228 (D.N.J. 1995) (dis-
12
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year statute of limitations “for trespass to real property[,] and [for any]
tortuous injury to real [or personal] property . . . .”75  However, the court
held that the statute of limitations did not start to run until remediation
measures started.76
cussing application of limitations period to actions seeking similar relief at
common law).  In Reichhold, the plaintiff sought damages from defendant, a metal
refining company, for past and future costs to clean up the plaintiff’s land, which
was contaminated by chlorinated volatile organic compounds (CVOCS). See Reich-
hold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 404.  The plaintiff brought its claims under the federal
CERCLA and Spill Act. See id.
75. Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining application of
another statute of limitations to Spill Act); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West
2015) (providing six-year statute of limitations for trespass and tortious injury to
property).  The state statute states:
Every action at law for trespass to real property, for any tortious in-
jury to real or personal property, for taking, detaining, or converting per-
sonal property, for replevin of goods or chattels, for any tortious injury to
the rights of another not stated in sections 2A:14-2 and 2A:14-3 of this
Title, or for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or im-
plied, not under seal, or upon an account other than one which concerns
the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors,
agents and servants, shall be commenced within 6 years next after the
cause of any such action shall have accrued.
This section shall not apply to any action for breach of any contract
for sale governed by section 12A: 2-725.
Id.
The court in Champion Labs, echoed the same reasoning for applying a six-year
statute of limitations. See Champion Labs., Inc. v. Metex Corp., No. 02-
5284(WHW), 2005 WL 1606921 (D.N.J. July 8, 2005) (applying six-year statute of
limitations and holding plaintiff’s contribution claim under Spill Act was time
barred).  In Champion Labs, the plaintiff discovered a holding tank containing
sludge was cracked and had contaminated groundwater on the property. See id. at
*1.  The court acknowledged the Spill Act did not provide a statute of limitations,
and so it turned to the reasoning in Montells to select a limitations period from
“statutes of limitation for actions seeking comparable relief at common law.” See
id. at *5; see also Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 659 (N.J. 1993) (providing
guidance on what to do when statute is silent as to statute of limitations).  The
court in Champion Labs followed the reasoning in New West Urban Renewal Co. that
“[a] private cause of action for contribution under the Spill Act is most analogous
to a common law environmental tort claim, for which the period of limitations is
six years.” See Champion Labs, 2005 WL 1606921, at *5; see also New W. Urban Re-
newal, 909 F. Supp. at 223 (analogizing Spill Act contribution claim to common law
environmental tort claim).
76. See Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (explaining statute of limitations does
not begin to run until remediation efforts commence); see also David Edelstein &
Craig Huber, Tick, Tock: Appellate Court Starts the Clock on Spill Act Contribution
Claims, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 2013, available at http://www.njlawjournal.com/
id=1202629127153/Tick-Tock-Appellate-Court-Starts-the-Clock-on-Spill-Act-Contri
bution-Claims?slreturn=20160230000732 [http://perma.cc/27JY-ZQCH] (distin-
guishing Reichhold decision from Morristown Associates based on when statute of lim-
itations begins).  The court in Reichhold clarifies that actions like “visiting the Site,
taking soil and water samples, and making engineering surveys are preliminary
steps” and are not considered initiating remediation for the purposes of starting
the limitations period. See Reichhold, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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III. NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING ALLOWS CONTRIBUTION
CLAIMS TO AVOID THE TEST OF TIME
Morristown Associates presented the opportunity for the New Jersey Su-
preme Court to finally decide the contested Spill Act statute of limitations
question.77  However, the court’s decision extended beyond mere prece-
dent.78  The court was aware the decision would have numerous implica-
tions for both civilian and legal communities.79  In addition to examining
precedent and the language of the Spill Act, the court turned to the amici
to understand the repercussions of upholding the lower courts’ decisions
and imposing a statute of limitations.80
A. Facts and Procedure
“In 1979, plaintiff, Morristown Associates, purchased commercial
property,” which included a strip-mall shopping center called Morristown
Plaza, in Morristown, New Jersey.81  Prior to Morristown Associates’
purchase, one of the tenants, Plaza Cleaners, “installed a steam boiler . . .
and an underground storage tank (UST)” to hold fuel oil to operate the
boiler.82  In 1993, Giorgio Engineering, P.C., conducted an “environmen-
tal audit of the Morristown Plaza property” and “incorrectly reported
there were no USTs” on the property.83
In August 2003, the plaintiff was notified that a well “installed near”
the shopping center was contaminated by fuel and “that the UST used by
Plaza Cleaners might be the source.”84  The UST was “severely deterio-
77. For further discussion about the contested statute of limitations question,
see supra notes 42–76 and accompanying text.
78. For further discussion of the weight behind court’s decision as high-
lighted by the amici, see infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
79. For further discussion about implications of court’s decision as high-
lighted by the amici and the NJSBA, see infra notes 103–07, 153–56 and accompa-
nying text.
80. For further discussion about the points raised by the amici, see infra notes
103–07 and accompanying text.
81. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176, 1178–79 (N.J. 2015).
82. See id. at 1179.  The United States Environmental Protection Agency de-
fines a UST as “a tank (or combination of tanks) and connected piping having at
least 10 percent of their combined volume underground.  The tank system in-
cludes the tank, underground connected piping, underground ancillary equip-
ment, and any containment system.” See Frequent Questions About Underground
Storage Tanks, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/ust/frequent-ques-
tions-about-underground-storage-tanks [https://perma.cc/9LCQ-66X7] (last up-
dated Dec. 15, 2015) (defining underground storage tank).  The Plaza Cleaners
owner who installed the UST sold the business to Edward and Amy Hsi, who
“owned the business until 1998, when it was sold to” Byung Lee, the “current
owner and third-party defendant.” See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1180.
83. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1179–80 (explaining environmental
audit); see also Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d 968, 972 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
(same), rev’d 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015).
84. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1179–80 (describing discovery of con-
tamination and notification of contamination source to plaintiff).
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rated” and replete with holes, which had led to the discharge.85  The oil
company defendants allegedly delivered varying amounts of fuel oil to
Plaza Cleaners on a monthly basis between 1988 and 2003.86  The plaintiff
denied knowing there was a UST on the property before 2003.87  The
plaintiff’s liability expert estimated “between 9,400 and 14,670 gallons of
heating oil were spilled from 1988 to 2003.”88
Shortly after the August investigation, remediation of the contami-
nated property began and the plaintiff brought a contribution claim
against the heating companies who delivered fuel oil to the UST and the
dry cleaners owners.89  In July 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint and
named Grant Oil Company (Grant Oil) as a defendant.90  The plaintiff
brought a claim under the Spill Act “seeking contribution for costs related
to the cleanup and removal of the fuel oil.”91
The state trial court held “the general six-year statute of limitations
for damage to property applie[d] to [ ] private claim[s] for contribution
[under the Spill Act].”92  The trial court also held that Morristown Associ-
ates “should have discovered its claims when the other leaking UST was
found in 1999 on the [ ] property.”93  The trial court dismissed claims for
damage that happened over a six-year period before a particular defen-
dant was brought into the case.94  The plaintiff alleged that the trial court
committed an error “because the six-year statute of limitations . . . d[id]
85. See id. (describing physical condition of UST).
86. See id. (explaining defendants’ role and liability in contamination of plain-
tiff’s property).
87. See id. at 1180 (denying knowledge of UST prior to 2003).
88. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d 968, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
(estimating damage caused by UST), rev’d, 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015).
89. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1180 (providing procedural history).
“At the time of lower court arguments, Morristown Associates, which owns Morris-
town Plaza, had spent roughly $1 million cleaning up contamination from an un-
derground fuel oil storage tank . . . .” See Samantha Marcus, Environmentalists Cheer
N.J. Supreme Court Ruling on Pollution Lawsuits, NJ.COM (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www
.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/environmental-
ists_cheer_nj_supreme_court_ruling_on.html [https://perma.cc/9TWB-F4JJ] (up-
dated Mar. 4, 2016) (quoting Steven Singer, Attorney for Morristown Associates).
90. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d at 970 (describing procedure).
91. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1180 (discussing plaintiff’s Spill Act
contribution claim).
92. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d at 972 (citation omitted).
93. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1181 (discussing trial court’s reason-
ing why Lopez discovery rule did not apply).  “Accordingly, the court granted mo-
tions of summary judgment by Spartan Oil, Petro, Johnson Oil, Meenan Oil doing
business as Region Oil, and the Hsis on statute of limitations grounds.” Id. at 1181
(discussing trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment motions).
94. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d at 972 (explaining trial court’s decision to
time-bar claims against defendants).
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not apply,” and thus “its claims were not untimely.”95  The appellate court
affirmed.96
B. New Jersey Supreme Court Throws out the Clock and Declares No Statute of
Limitations for Spill Act Contribution Claims
The court considered a series of viewpoints, both from the parties in
litigation and the amici.97  The plaintiff contended the Spill Act explicitly
stated the available defenses in a contribution action, and a statute of limi-
tations was not included.98  Pointing to numerous Spill Act amendments
that did not create a statute of limitations, the plaintiff argued that the
legislature’s inaction was evidence of intent.99
The defendant argued that because there was no “explicit statute of
limitations, the court should apply the limitations period for actions seek-
ing comparable relief at common law, focusing on the nature of the in-
jury, not the legal theory of the individual claim.”100  The defendant
contended the six-year statute of limitations for trespass or tortious injury
to real property must apply because the plaintiff’s injury was damage to
95. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1181 (alleging trial court’s error at
issue on appeal).
96. See id. (explaining appellate court’s holding and highlighting Pitney
Bowes).  The appellate court acknowledged that there was an unpublished New
Jersey state court decision “that [held] no statute of limitations appli[ed]” to the
Spill Act. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d at 973.  Recognizing that the unpub-
lished opinions are not precedential, the court did not give much weight to the
state court’s decision. See id.  The court distinguished the case at bar from Pitney
Bowes, declaring Pitney Bowes to be non-controlling because it dealt with a “statute
of repose rather than a statute of limitations.” See id. at 974.  The court found this
difference significant because “the Lopez discovery rule is not available to relax
application of a statute of repose,” but it is with a statute of limitations. See id.  The
court reasoned that a statute of limitations, unlike a statute of repose, “does not
prevent a [ ] plaintiff from recovering” from another party under the Spill Act
because “[i]t merely requires that a claimant file a timely action after it discovered
or should have discovered the grounds for its claim.” See id.  The court then
pointed out that “general statutes of limitations have been applied to” other statu-
tory claims that do not explicitly possess a statute of limitation. See id.
97. For further discussion of the insight provided by the parties and amici, see
infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
98. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1182 (“Plaintiff points out that the
Spill Act itself contains no statute of limitations on filing contribution claims and
maintains that there is no ‘hard and fast rule’ requiring the application of a statute
of limitations when a statute is silent.”).
99. See id. (highlighting plaintiff’s argument of relying on Montells v. Haynes
which applied statute of limitations despite statute silence).
100. See id. at 1182–83 (quoting defendant’s argument which also relied on
the Montells case, cited by plaintiffs).
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real property.101  The court took a textual approach to determine legisla-
tive intent and held a statute of limitations did not apply.102
Six groups submitted amicus curiae briefs.103  Overall, “the amici pro-
vide[d] practical insight into the implications of imposing a statute of limi-
tations on Spill Act contribution claims.”104  The amici pointed to possible
repercussions of imposing a statute of limitations on these claims.105  The
majority of amici contended “the Appellate Division incorrectly held that a
six-year statute of limitations applies to Spill Act contribution claims.”106
They “echo[ed]” the sentiment that imposing a statute of limitations
would be detrimental for New Jersey and the success of the Spill Act.107
101. See id. at 1183 (stating defendants’ reasoning to apply N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1);
see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 2015) (providing six-year statute of limita-
tions for trespass to real property or tortious injury to real or personal property).
The defendant relied on the “[l]egislature’s failure to expressly prohibit a statute
of limitations” to bolster its argument. See Morristown Assocs. I, 106 A.3d at 1183.
102. For further discussion of the court’s approach for interpreting the Spill
Act, see infra notes 109–23 and accompanying text.
103. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1181–82 (discussing court’s decision
to grant “leave to appear” as amici to six groups in case).  The six groups were the
Innocent Landowners Group, Environmental Amici, New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP), New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA),
Municipal Amici, and Passaic River Coalition. See id.  Environmental Amici was
collectively made up of Ironbound Community Corporation, The Association of
New Jersey Environmental Commissions, NY/NJ Baykeeper, Environment New
Jersey, The Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and the New Jersey Work Environment
Council. See id.  The New Jersey State League of Municipalities and New Jersey
Institute of Local Government Attorneys together make up the Municipal Amici
group. See id. at 1182.  In New Jersey, a court must grant a motion to appear as
amicus curiae “if it is satisfied under all the circumstances that the motion is
timely, the applicant’s participation will assist in the resolution of an issue of public
importance, and no party to the litigation will be unduly prejudiced thereby.” N.J.
CT. R. 1:13-9.
104. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1183–84 (discussing contribution of
amici and summarizing amici comments).
105. See id. at 1183 (discussing amici’s contribution to case).  For example,
Innocent Landowners argued “a six-year statute of limitations would subject inno-
cent owners . . . to de facto liability . . . [and] permit dischargers of hazardous
material to avoid liability.” Id. at 1184.  The amici mirrored plaintiff’s argument
and expanded on the reason why a statute of limitations is not applicable to Spill
Act claims. See id. at 1183 (“The amici largely echo plaintiff’s argument and offer
further support for concluding that no statute of limitations applies to Spill Act
claims.”).
106. See id. (discussing amici’s support for no application of statute of limita-
tions).  The NJSBA argued that if the court imposes a statute of limitations it
“should have [a] prospective effect” and “not begin to run at the time of discov-
ery.” See id. n.4.  The court decided not to address the NJSBA’s arguments in its
opinion because it found the statute of limitations did not apply. See id. (“Because
we find the statute of limitations inapplicable, we do not address those
arguments.”).
107. See id. at 1183 (explaining amici’s contribution).  Innocent Landowners
focused on how “the remedial investigation phase of [ ] site contamination” takes a
long time, and a filing limit would not expedite the process. See id. at 1183–84.  A
statute of limitations would hurt innocent landowners while permitting dischargers
to escape liability. See id.  Innocent Landowners emphasized, “imposing a six-year
17
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The New Jersey Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision on Jan-
uary 26, 2015.108  Beginning with a plain language analysis of the Spill Act,
the court noted that the Act did not state the existence or applicability of a
statute of limitations.109  The court emphasized the restrictive language of
the contribution provision, which stated, “[a] contribution defendant shall
have only the defenses to liability available to parties pursuant to [the Spill
Act’s section on liability for cleanup and removal costs].”110  Because the
limit will interpose tremendous turmoil into Spill Act contribution claims already
filed in the trial courts.” See id. at 1184.
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) highlighted how a stat-
ute of limitations undermines legislative intent and hinders the agency’s “ability to
enforce the Spill Act.” See id.  The DEP emphasized that the success of remedia-
tion efforts depends on the ability of private parties to bring forth private contribu-
tion claims, as an estimated “seventy-two percent of the sites currently in the Site
Remediation Program are being remediated by private entities.” See id.  However,
a statute of limitations makes it more difficult to collect from responsible parties.
See id. (“DEP also contends that the Appellate Division’s opinion frustrates its abil-
ity to enforce the Spill Act by raising uncertainty as to what other defenses not
explicitly provided by the statute may be added by the courts.”).
Municipal Amici acknowledged taxpayers are negatively impacted by a limita-
tion on contribution claims by a statute of limitation, because New Jersey munici-
palities use the Spill Act to get money “for remediating contaminated properties.”
See id.  The amici also highlighted the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA), “passed
the same year that the contribution provision was added to the Spill Act,” does not
have a statute of limitations. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 (West 2015).
The ISRA states:
If a municipality undertakes a remediation of an industrial establishment,
the title to which the municipality acquired pursuant to a foreclosure ac-
tion pertaining to a certificate of tax sale, all expenditures incurred in the
remediation shall be a debt of the immediate past owner or operator of
the industrial establishment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9.3.  The Municipal Amici argue that it would “be illogical
for a municipality to be able to recover without a time limitation under ISRA, if a
property was acquired through foreclosure pertaining to a certificate of tax sale,
but not under the Spill Act, when a property was acquired through purchase or
eminent domain.” See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1184.
Environmental Amici argued implementing a statute of limitations would
make it more difficult to obtain contribution from responsible parties and nega-
tively impact New Jersey’s “ability to ensure that its citizens can drink clean water,
take their children to chemical-free playgrounds and build their homes on uncon-
taminated land.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Passaic River Coalition (PRC) contended a statute of limitations would pro-
duce “unnecessary litigation” and negatively impact “cooperation between poten-
tially responsible parties.” See id.  PRC explains this “would be a waste of judicial
resources” and parties’ resources would be redirected away from investigation and
cleanup, two of the Spill Act’s main goals. See id.
108. See generally Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1176.
109. See id. at 1188 (“Neither this provision, nor any other provision in the
Spill Act, sets forth a statute of limitations applicable to such contribution actions
or states that a statute of limitations is not applicable.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 58:10–23.11f(a)(2))).
110. See id. at 1189 (first alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a)).
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list “d[id] not include a statute of limitations defense,” the court found
this indicative that no time constraint applied.111
The court distinguished Montells and declared its reasoning inapplica-
ble because “the Spill Act is not silent.”112  Rather, it determined the Spill
Act explicitly lists all the available defenses for contribution claims.113
The court pointed out that because it found Montells irrelevant for the
Morristown Associates decision, it would not discuss federal case law that
relied on the reasoning in Montells.114  The court concluded “[a] com-
mon-sense reading of the plain language chosen by the Legislature” im-
plied the legislature did not intend to include a statute of limitations
defense.115
The court then briefly analyzed the “wide net” of coverage intended
by the Spill Act.116  It suggested it was unlikely the legislature intended to
allow responsible parties to escape liability based on a time defense.117
The court referred to the Spill Act’s section concerning the filing of
claims, which includes a one-year statute of limitations, to support its asser-
tion that the legislature included a statute of limitations in the Spill Act
where it intended.118  On this basis, the court refused to impose a statute
of limitations for contribution claims merely because it is not explicitly
permitted or forbidden.119
Following this analysis, the court concluded that, even if the language
of the Spill Act was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence supported its interpreta-
tion.120  The 1979 amendment that removed the language in the Spill Act
111. See id. (“The language of the statute expressly restricting the defenses
available under the Spill Act provides significant support for a conclusion that no
statute of limitations applies.”).
112. See id. (“[H]ere the Spill Act is not silent.  The Spill Act enumerates the
only defenses specified as available to contribution defendants and a statute of
limitations defense is not included.”).
113. See id.
114. See id. n.8 (“In light of our rejection of Montells’s applicability in our
analysis, we find it unnecessary to further discuss federal case law that relied on
Montells when determining to apply a statute of limitations to Spill Act claims.”).
115. See id. at 1189 (recognizing “[t]he only defenses available to contribution
claims were to be the ones to which the Legislature specifically referred.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
116. See id. (discussing intent of Spill Act to “cast a wide net over those respon-
sible for hazardous substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this
state”).
117. See id. at 1190 (“The Legislature could not have intended to permit its
imposition of contribution liability on culpable dischargers to be frustrated by the
imposition of a general and prior enacted, but unreferenced, statute of
limitations.”).
118. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11k (West 2015) (establishing
one-year statute of limitations for claims filings).
119. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1190 (noting legislature included
statute of limitations in Spill Act where it wanted and court’s unwillingness to im-
pose statute of limitations).
120. See id.  The court noted that precedent permits it to look at extrinsic
evidence to determine legislative intent “[w]hen the plain language of a statute is
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that permitted certain available defenses and the accompanying Sponsor’s
statement suggested “a specific legislative intent to eliminate other other-
wise available defenses.”121  The court concluded by inviting the legisla-
ture to correct “any interpretive misunderstanding” if its intent
contradicted the court’s interpretation.122  Nevertheless, without such leg-
islative intervention permitting a statute of limitations defense, the court
“decline[d] to handicap the Spill Act’s intentionally broad effect in such
manner.”123
IV. TIME FOR A CHANGE: LEGISLATURE MUST AMEND SPILL ACT TO
ENSURE FAIR TREATMENT OF DEFENDANTS
The New Jersey Supreme Court appropriately used a plain text analy-
sis of the Spill Act to reach its holding.124  Had the court upheld a statute
of limitations, the effectiveness of the Spill Act would have undoubtedly
been hindered and the repercussions on various groups would have been
substantial.125  Interpretations beyond the plain language of the text are
jobs for legislatures, not courts.126  Despite the reasonable judicial ap-
proach of Morristown Associates, it would unfairly prejudice defendants to
allow the Spill Act to stand without a statute of limitations.127
ambiguous or open to more than one plausible meaning . . . .” See id. (quoting
State v. Marquez, 998 A.2d 421, 430 (N.J. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121. See id. (discussing 1979 Spill Act amendment); see also 1976 N.J. Laws 627
(amending available defenses under Spill Act).
122. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1190 (“If the Legislature intended
something other than what we perceive to be a broad approach to holding parties
responsible for their role in polluting the land and waters of New Jersey, then
legislative correction can fix any interpretive misunderstanding.”).
123. See id. (asserting its stance that no statute of limitations apply).
124. See id. at 1189 (explaining plain text supports court’s interpretation).
“We add only that our holding does not negatively affect responsible parties under
the Spill Act any more than the Act already has by virtue of its imposition of contri-
bution liability.” Id.
125. For further discussion of the ramifications for imposing a statute of limi-
tations on Spill Act contribution claims, see supra note 107 and accompanying text;
see also Martin Bricketto, NJ High Court Could Turn up the Heat on Spill Act Plaintiffs,
LAW360 (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/583565/nj-high-court-
could-turn-up-the-heat-on-spill-act-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/3C6Q-HARC]
(stressing decision by New Jersey Supreme Court to uphold appellate division’s
decision retroactively would have “sideswipe[d] property owners that were playing
by the rules”).
126. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1190 (“Our role is simply to discern
as best we can legislative intent and to implement that intent.”).
127. For further discussion of how statute of limitations unfairly prejudices
defendants, see infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
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A. The Danger of Letting Time Stand Still: Why the Legislature Must Amend
the Spill Act to Include a Statute of Limitations
The Spill Act currently tips the scales of justice in favor of plaintiffs
while making it more difficult for defendants to dismiss remediation
claims potentially years after contamination is discovered.128  The holding
in Morristown Associates reaffirms plaintiffs’ ability to bring contribution
claims under the Spill Act with no concern about time constraints.129
However, this flexibility inadvertently cripples defendants’ ability to fairly
defend against expensive remediation claims.130  This places defendants
at a legal disadvantage, subjecting them to a constant state of litigation
limbo where defendants remain vulnerable to potential lawsuits decades
after remediation efforts have ceased.131  Allegedly responsible parties
might no longer have the funds to pay a contribution bill if the remediat-
ing party postpones bringing a claim until years after remediation efforts
have ended.132
It is clear from Morristown Associates that a mere imposition of a statute
of limitations without any further changes to the Spill Act would do more
harm than good to parties outside litigation.133  The New Jersey Supreme
Court dismissed the New Jersey State Bar Association’s (NJSBA) amicus
128. For further discussion of how the Spill Act favors plaintiffs and hurts
defendants, see infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
129. See Richard F. Ricci & Sean Collier, NJ High Court Lays Down the Law on
Spill Suit Limits, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/615737/
nj-high-court-lays-down-the-law-on-spill-suit-limits [https://perma.cc/Y9W9-
6QNM] (“Claimants may now fully engage in the often lengthy process of investi-
gating and remediating contaminated sites and identifying other responsible par-
ties before initiating contribution litigation, and need not race to the courthouse
to beat a statute of limitations deadline.”).
130. See Katcher et al., supra note 15 (noting burden placed on defendants in
contribution claims by limiting the number of available defenses).
131. See, e.g., Lanny S. Kurzweil & Amanda G. Dumville, New Jersey Supreme
Court: No Statute of Limitations for Private Claims for Contribution Under NJ Spill Act,
ENV’T & ENERGY ALERT (McCarter & English, Newark, N.J.), Jan. 2015, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.mccarter.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Website/Jan
2015_EnvironmentEnergyAlert_Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3EX-XYBG] (“Con-
tribution plaintiffs that otherwise might have accelerated their claims and rushed
to the state courthouse can take their time and proceed more strategically; contri-
bution defendants have lost a (short-lived) defense absent legislative revision, with
the added risk that evidence and witnesses may be lost during the period of de-
lay.”); see also David Restaino, High Court’s Spill Act Statute of Limitations Ruling Alters
New Jersey’s Cleanup Landscape, LEGAL OP. LETTER, Apr. 10, 2015, at 1, 2 available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/RestainoLOL_0410
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7FY-Y7KL] (“Defendants, on the other hand, now
know that they can be subject to suit for many years and perhaps even decades.”).
132. See, e.g., Katcher et al., supra note 15 (highlighting importance of filing
litigation sooner because of possibility third parties will no longer have funds to
pay for remediation costs).
133. For further discussion of amici’s input on imposing a statute of limita-
tions, see supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
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brief without giving appropriate weight to the unique points raised.134  In
deciding to apply a statute of limitations to the Spill Act, the legislature
should look to the NJSBA’s amicus brief for insight on using a CERCLA
model to start the statute of limitations clock and the importance of a
prospective application.135
B. Legislation Is Necessary to Amend the Spill Act, It’s Now or Never
In its amicus brief, the NJSBA provides invaluable insight into how
the legal community and its clients would be impacted if a statute of limi-
tations were imposed.136  Furthermore, the NJSBA’s amicus brief provides
guidance for creating improved legislation that minimizes a potentially
negative impact on attorneys and their clients.137  The NJSBA focuses its
attention first on when the statute of limitations clock would begin to run
and second on ensuring that the application is prospective.138
The NJSBA emphasizes the importance of deciding when a statute of
limitations clock will begin to run and how the constructs of environmen-
tal litigation favor a CERCLA model approach over the discovery rule.139
In Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil, the superior court emphasized the
New Jersey discovery rule would avoid a stringent application of a statute
of limitations by taking into account when a claimant “discovered or could
reasonably have discovered the harm.”140  However, the NJSBA notes that
the discovery rule is not practical for quick remediation or fair for
remediating parties.141
134. See Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176, 1183 n.4 (N.J. 2015) (explaining
omission of NJSBA amicus brief from court opinion).
135. For further discussion of the NJSBA’s push for the CERCLA model, see
infra notes 136–56 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n at 17–19,
Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015), available at http://tcms.njsba.com/
PersonifyEbusiness/images/content/1/0/1007423.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF4H-
SVZM] (providing insight on imposing statute of limitations).
137. See id. at 1 (explaining burden placed on courts, attorneys, and clients if
supreme court affirmed lower court decisions).  The NJSBA emphasized that if the
supreme court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, courts would be burdened
by attorneys compelled “to file lawsuits seeking Spill Act contribution prematurely
or file claims that may never have been filed, solely to protect their clients’ rights
and themselves from claims of malpractice.” See id.
138. For further discussion of the NJSBA’s arguments concerning the applica-
tion of a statute of limitations, see infra notes 139–56 and accompanying text.
139. See Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at
2–4 (providing arguments about imposing statute of limitations).
140. See Morristown Assocs. I, 74 A.3d 968, 974 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
(explaining how discovery rule prevents harsh statute of limitations application),
rev’d, 106 A.3d 1176 (N.J. 2015).
141. See Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at
17–19 (explaining use of discovery rule to start clock on statute of limitations is
more harmful than good).
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In its brief, the NJSBA highlights three significant problems that arise
by using the discovery rule to start the limitations period.142  First, the
discovery rule would discourage parties from engaging in remediation ef-
forts, resulting in an increase in claims being filed earlier to avoid losing
the opportunity to recover from contributing parties.143  Parties who dis-
cover contamination, but find themselves time-barred because of the dis-
covery rule, will likely delay remediation efforts.144  Second, the discovery
rule is not feasible on large properties.145  For example, a party who dis-
covers one underground storage tank but does not check the remainder
of the property can find themselves running out the clock under the dis-
covery rule.146  Third, and most importantly, “responsible parties who are
strictly liable under the Spill Act” can escape liability because of the discov-
ery rule.147  As the NJSBA points out, if this happens, “the purpose of the
Spill Act, to have responsible parties strictly liable for cleaning up contami-
nation, is lost.”148
Instead, the NJSBA suggests using the CERCLA model as an alterna-
tive to using the discovery rule to start the statute of limitations clock.149
Currently, plaintiffs have a right to contribution, yet that right does not
vest until remediation efforts have commenced.150  The federal CERCLA
142. See id. at 17–20 (highlighting significant problems that can arise through
use of discovery rule).
143. See id. at 11 (stating imposing discovery rule “[w]ould have the effect of
discouraging parties from voluntarily investigating and remediating contamina-
tion, and would cause parties to file lawsuits before they are ready, and often times
unnecessarily”).
144. See id. at 17 (discussing possible negative effect of discovery rule).
145. See id. at 18 (“The ‘discovery rule’ as applied by the trial court and Appel-
late Division in this case simply is not practical in the real world.”).
146. See id. (discussing problem that can arise for owners of large properties).
147. See id. at 19 (explaining danger of responsible parties being released
from liability because of discovery rule).
148. See id. at 20 (explaining how intent of Spill Act is undermined by impos-
ing discovery rule).
149. See id. at 3 (noting superiority of CERCLA method).
150. See Bricketto, supra note 125 (restating remarks by Kevin Bruno, Chair,
Blank Rome LLP, Env’l, Energy, & Natural Res. Grp., concerning right of plaintiffs
to obtain contribution).  The NJSBA sheds light on why the discovery rule does not
work along with the vesting of a plaintiff’s right to sue for contribution:
[I]n order to sue for contribution under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2), a
person must first receive written approval for the incurrence of those
costs from the NJDEP, or now from a Licensed Site Remediation Profes-
sional (“LSRP”), the statutory agent of the NJDEP, in accordance with
N.J.S.A. 58:10C-1 et. seq.  And, that is exactly why the “discovery rule”
cannot be the starting point for the commencement of the running of
the statute of limitations, because until “cleanup and removal costs” are
incurred with the written approval of the NJDEP or the LSRP, the right to
seek contribution under N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)has [sic] not yet rip-
ened.  Thus, the date of discovery of contamination or when contamina-
tion should have been discovered is irrelevant to when the right to
contribution under the Spill Act accrues.
Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at 13.
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model has a better approach.151  CERCLA, which has an explicit three-
year statute of limitations, starts the limitation period based on the date of
a judgment, administrative order, or judicially approved settlement.152
Moreover, to protect claimants and attorneys, the NJSBA advocates
for a prospective rather than a retroactive application of a statute of limita-
tions.153  There is a legitimate concern that retroactive application of a
statute of limitations would leave environmental attorneys vulnerable to
malpractice lawsuits.154  The NJSBA acknowledges that this would be un-
fair to those attorneys who, believing that they were correctly advising
their clients, relied “in good faith” on both Pitney Bowes and Mason in their
decision to wait to file.155  Additionally, claimants who voluntarily engaged
in lengthy and expensive litigation with the expectation of bringing a con-
tribution claim could be prevented by a retroactive statute of limitations
application.156
V. KEEPING UP WITH THE TIMES: ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS IN LIGHT
OF MORRISTOWN ASSOCIATES
Attorneys need to adjust their client advice following Morristown Asso-
ciates and in anticipation of possible action by the legislature in order to
safeguard themselves and their clients.157  In particular, attorneys must
warn clients about the possibility of environmental litigation years after a
company or property is sold.158  This is important for commercial real es-
tate counsel, “especially if the client is an owner or prospective purchaser
151. See Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at
2 (suggesting CERCLA as model for when to start limitations clock).
152. See id. (discussing structure of limitations period clock under CERCLA).
153. See id. at 2–4, 9–10, 20 (advocating for prospective rather than retroac-
tive application of statute of limitations).  Notably, the NJSBA’s brief was not writ-
ten in support of the supreme court applying a statute of limitations. See id. at 1–2
(stating the NJSBA “believes the interpretation of the Spill Act in New Jersey State
courts for these last twenty (20) years that there is no statute of limitations for Spill
Act contribution claims has worked without problem”).  Rather, the NJSBA brief
says that if one were to be applied, it should be done prospectively rather than
retroactively. See id. at 2.
154. See Martin Bricketto, NJ High Court Prevents Rush to Courthouse on Spill
Suits, LAW 360 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/615446/nj-high-
court-prevents-rush-to-courthouse-on-spill-suits [https://perma.cc/G3M9-XUWB]
(emphasizing concern of NJSBA members that “retroactive application of the stat-
ute of limitations could generate unfair malpractice litigation against attorneys
who properly advised their clients based on the current state of the law”).
155. See Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at
4 (explaining unfair effects of retroactive application on attorneys).
156. See id. (discussing potential unfair effect of retroactive application on po-
tential claimants).
157. See Practical Law Real Estate, No Six-year Statute of Limitations for NJ’s Spill
Contribution Act, LEGAL UPDATE (WestlawNext, N.J.), Feb. 5, 2015, at 1, 2 (discuss-
ing need to adjust attorney advice to clients).
158. See Restaino, supra note 131 (emphasizing important considerations for
attorneys when advising clients in light of Morristown Associates).  David Restaino
highlights the importance for attorneys to consider the implications of the New
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of a property where potential environmental hazards are likely.”159  Real
estate attorneys should stress to clients the importance of “the discovery
and inspection of underground storage tanks when performing environ-
mental due diligence.”160  Also, deciding to “pursue and defend contribu-
tion claims early in the remediation process” can be extremely beneficial
and make it more likely for parties to defend and recover under the Spill
Act.161
VI. ONLY TIME WILL TELL: THE IMPACT OF MORRISTOWN ASSOCIATES
Remediation of contaminated property in New Jersey significantly de-
pends on cleanup efforts by private parties.162  With the number of con-
taminated sites increasing, the ability for parties to easily recover
contribution costs from responsible parties is imperative to ensuring quick
and efficient cleanup measures.163  Environmental groups praised the rul-
ing in Morristown Associates as monumental, claiming an opposite ruling by
the supreme court would have severely handicapped the Spill Act.164  Al-
though the court’s hands were tied, the legislature should take action to
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision as it stands in advising clients about the potential
for environmental litigation in the future:
One can expect that the potential for unending environmental liabilities
will become an even more important topic for consideration during
property and corporate transactions.  Those practitioners who fail to con-
sider environmental liabilities that will follow a company decades after a
property or a business has been sold will do so at their own peril.
Id.
159. See Practical Law Real Estate, supra note 157 (stating importance of advis-
ing clients concerning future environmental liability).
160. See id. (providing advice to real estate attorneys when advising clients).
161. See Katcher et al., supra note 15, at 2 (explaining benefit of early
remediation litigation).
Aside from potential future Legislative action, there are other factors to
consider in deciding whether to pursue and defend contribution claims
early in the remediation process, including: the preservation of evidence;
less risk that potentially responsible parties, including additional third-
parties, will no longer be viable or financially able to contribute to the
cleanup; the potential for buy-in and agreement on the selected remedy;
and the potential for reaching a resolution outside of costly litigation.
Id.
162. For further discussion of the importance of private-party contribution
actions for the success of remediation efforts, see supra notes 6–10 and accompany-
ing text.
163. For further discussion of the increase in contaminated sites, see supra
note 4–5 and accompanying text; see also Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d 1176, 1184
(N.J. 2015) (estimating 72% of sites are remediated by private parties).
164. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 89 (reporting on impact of Spill Act accord-
ing to environmentalists).  “Jeff Tittel, director of the New Jersey Sierra Club,
called the decision a victory for environmental protection.  ‘Had the lower court
decision been upheld, it would have gutted the Spill Act and made it virtually
impossible to clean up contaminated sites,’ he said.  ‘With 20,000 contaminated
sites in New Jersey this is an important victory. . .  It will ma[ke] sure these sites get
cleaned up and that polluters do not allow the clock to run out.” Id.
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ensure the Spill Act is fair for both plaintiffs and defendants dealing with
contribution claim litigation.165  In the meantime, attorneys should adjust
their communications with clients accordingly to account for the court’s
decision and the looming uncertainty about legislative action.166  It re-
mains to be seen whether the legislature will take action to amend the
Spill Act, or if the legislature’s prolonged silence will imply agreement
with the court’s decision in Morristown Associates.167
165. For further discussion of why the legislature must take action, see supra
notes 124–56 and accompanying text.
166. For further discussion about attorney advice, see supra notes 157–65 and
accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Morristown Assocs. II, 106 A.3d at 1190 (inviting legislature to fix
any misunderstanding); see also Kurzweil & Dumville, supra note 131 (noting possi-
bility legislature may react to fix any misunderstanding “when and if it sees fit”).
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